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Paper by invitation 
Introducing Formalism in 
Economics: The Growth Model 
of John von Neumann 
 
Summary: The objective is to interpret John von Neumann's growth model as
a decisive step of the forthcoming formalist revolution of the 1950s in econom-
ics. This model gave rise to an impressive variety of comments about its classi-
cal or neoclassical underpinnings. We go beyond this traditional criterion and
interpret rather this model as the manifestation of von Neumann's involvement
in the formalist programme of mathematician David Hilbert. We discuss the 
impact of Kurt Gödel’s discoveries on this programme. We show that the
growth model reflects the pragmatic turn of the formalist programme after
Gödel and proposes the extension of modern axiomatisation to economics. 
Key words: Von Neumann, Growth model, Formalist revolution, Mathematical 
formalism, Axiomatics. 
JEL: A12, B23, B41, C02.
 
 
 
 
In the immediate post-War years, Mark Blaug (1999, 2003) identified the emergence 
of a new paradigm in economics, the so-called “formalist paradigm”, which marked 
the arrival of the pre-eminence of (mathematical) form over (theoretical) content, and 
which is mostly characterised by the crucial importance economists give to a specific 
(non-constructive) kind of demonstration of existence of equilibrium. This revolution 
took shape in the 1950s and 1960s around the works of Arrow, Debreu, Patinkin, 
Solow, Dorfmann, Samuelson and Koopmans.  
The objective of this paper is to interpret John von Neumann’s growth model 
(1937) as a decisive step of this formalist revolution, and by doing so, contribute to 
the definition of the formalist paradigm in economics. The 1937 model, it will be 
argued, is the manifestation of von Neumann’s involvement in the formalist pro-
gramme of mathematician David Hilbert, and provides economists with the new 
mathematical tools and methodology that will characterise the emerging paradigm in 
economics.  
The 1937 paper gave rise to an impressive variety of contrasting comments as 
far as the filiations (classical versus neoclassical) of the growth model are concerned, 
and constitutes one of those enigmas which historians of economic thought are so 
fond of. However, the identification of an economic formalist paradigm allows one to 
go beyond the traditional demarcation line between classical and neoclassical eco-
nomics and challenges the legitimacy of such a criterion. The issue of the nature of 
the assumptions upon which the 1937 model is based becomes much less relevant 
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than that of the extent of the methodological innovation introduced by von Neumann, 
namely, the introduction of the modern axiomatic approach in economics.  
The aim of the following sections is to elucidate this interpretation through a 
rational reconstruction of the epistemological approach adopted by von Neumann in 
the 1937 paper. The result of this reconstruction may be summarised in this way: von 
Neumann gives here an economic interpretation to a specific formal system which he 
initially elaborated in his previous work of 1928 on game theory. Each term here has 
a precise meaning: a “formal system” is composed of (1) a set of symbols, (2) a set of 
rules for transforming these symbols into formulae, (3) a set of rules for transforming 
the formulae, and (4) a reduced number of formulae representing the axioms of the 
system to be observed. By construction, a formal system has no semantic content and 
may take on different interpretations. A “model” is an interpretation that is given to a 
formal system. The clear-cut separation between syntax and semantics – between the 
formal aspects of the system and its various interpretations – is one of the most sali-
ent characteristics of modern axiomatics.  
In order to prove that the scope of the 1937 model may be correctly grasped 
by understanding von Neumann’s global epistemological approach, we will proceed 
as follows. It is first necessary to offer a brief overview of the growth model and of 
the controversy over the filiations (section 1); the variety of the comments is by itself 
an invitation to consider an alternative interpretation. We found such an alternative in 
von Neumann’s involvement in the formalist Hilbertian programme so that the clas-
sical/neoclassical demarcation line may well be replaced by the formalist/non-
formalist criterion, as Blaug (2003) and Nicola Giocoli (2003) suggest (section 2). 
The term “formalism” is ambiguous and requires further elucidation. In particular, 
the question of the impact of Gödel’s discoveries on the formalist programme is of 
primary interest to us to the extent that, it will be argued, the 1937 paper is a mani-
festation of the pragmatic turn that Gödel lays on formalist mathematicians (section 
3). We will then have all the elements to show that von Neumann’s main achieve-
ment in his 1937 paper has been to propose to economists the substitution of the me-
chanical analogy with the mathematical analogy, as a result of his participation in the 
post-Gödelian mathematical formalist programme (section 4).  
 
1. The 1937 Model and its Various Interpretations 
 
In the 1937 article, von Neumann characterises the equilibrium configuration of an 
economy expanding at a uniform rate. In equilibrium, prices are constant, as are the 
quantity ratios between different goods. Several simplifying assumptions are intro-
duced by von Neumann to make equilibrium possible: constant returns to scale; pure 
and perfect competition; unlimited quantities of goods available through the produc-
tive process (this applies to land and labour, no primary factors existing in the 
model); no savings from workers who are depicted as draft animals; and no con-
sumption from producers who save the totality of their income.  
Production is considered a temporal process (of length of one period) of trans-
forming one set of goods into another; for reasons of simplicity and for ensuring the 
unity of the solution, von Neumann also had to make the assumption that each good 
entered the productive process of all goods, be it as input or output, and also in an 
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arbitrarily small proportion. The cost of production of one good depends on the value 
of the goods necessary for its production, plus the interest rate; the prices of goods 
correspond to their production costs, whatever the preferences of workers or produc-
ers are.  
Solving this model allows identifying the following.  
  Which, among the set of goods in the economy, are the free goods whose 
price must be fixed equal to zero, and what the prices are of the other non-
free goods; free goods are goods whose produced quantity exceeds the 
quantity used in the production process in a proportion higher than the rate 
of growth of the economy. Introducing the free goods rule allowed von 
Neumann to avoid the occurrence of negative prices at equilibrium, and, 
from a mathematical point of view, transform the representation of the 
economy by introducing linear inequalities into the model;   Which are the profitable production processes and which ones are non-
profitable and will, therefore, not be implemented (a profitability rule 
which, like the free goods rule, leads to the use of linear inequalities in the 
model); the model allows the determination of the maximum intensity with 
which each profitable process will be implemented – that is, the produced 
quantities of each good, and, thus, given the constant returns to scale as-
sumption, the growth rate of the economy;   The dual symmetry of the model is one of its essential properties and mani-
fests as follows;  Solving the model may be interpreted on the one hand as a problem of 
technological choice: given the price vector, it is possible to determine the 
vector of the maximum possible produced quantities and the optimal 
growth rate, under the constraint of the free goods rule and given the im-
possibility of consuming more than is produced;  Solving the model may also be interpreted on the other hand as a problem 
of economic expansion, which turns out to be the mirror image of the pre-
vious problem. It consists of determining the optimal price vector and in-
terest rate which prevail, given the intensities of production processes, the 
efficiency rule, and the competitive constraint according to which no extra 
profits are allowed.  
 
Von Neumann showed that an equilibrium solution exists, that it is unique, 
and that the interest rate of this configuration is equal to the growth rate. The proof of 
existence breaks with the traditional attempts of demonstrating the existence of a 
general equilibrium configuration consisting of counting the numbers of equations 
and unknowns. Such an approach did not constitute sufficient proof of existence, 
and, furthermore, the model was formalised in terms of inequalities (the free goods 
rule and the profitability rule) and thus required specific mathematical tools. The 
demonstration of existence provided by the author consisted in an extension of 
Broüwer’s Fix Point Theorem and represented the first introduction of topological 
tools in economic analysis: von Neumann introduced a new function, ф (X, Y), 
which represents the ratio between the total incomes and the total costs, and demon-
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strates the existence of a solution of the growth model, amounting to demonstrating 
the existence of a saddle point for function ф. Now, the existence of this saddle point 
is itself the consequence of von Neumann’s demonstration of a fix point lemma. This 
demonstration is non-constructive in the sense that no method is provided for the 
determination of the fix point; with this kind of demonstration, equilibrium thus be-
comes a purely logical concept. Existence is demonstrated by showing that non-
existence would involve a logical contradiction. As emphasised by Giocoli (2003, p. 
8) and also Blaug (2003, p. 146), this kind of non-constructive proof (or “negative 
proof”) allows a direct jump from the axioms of the model to its final outcome and 
accounts for the neglect of mainstream economists in the analysis of the economic 
process that leads to equilibrium. 
With the notable exception of Harold W. Kuhn and Albert W. Tucker (1958) 
who provide an analysis of the mathematics of von Neumann’s proof, economists in 
the 1950s and 1960s mainly concentrated their comments on the economic filiations 
of this model. In 1959, the Kaldor–Solow debate that unfolded during the Corfù Con-
ference on Capital was the starting point of a long controversy over the interpretation 
of the 1937 model. Kaldor insisted upon the classical underpinnings of von Neu-
mann’s growth model, whereas Solow emphasised the possibility of integrating this 
model into the neoclassical framework. The arguments advanced by the two econo-
mists set the tone of future debate.  
  Supporters of a classical interpretation insist on the heterodox nature of the 
assumptions on which the model is built. Kaldor, for instance, essentially 
based his position on von Neumann’s assumption of infinite expansion of 
primary factors for, according to him, one of the defining features of main-
stream economics is precisely the existence of a physical constraint on the 
available quantity of these resources. In the same way, Luigi Pasinetti 
(1977) stressed the circular character of the production process, whereas 
Heinz Kurz and Neri Salvadori (1993) insisted on its temporal dimension 
and on the proximity of certain of the model’s characteristics with past 
contributions of classical authors, from Petty to Remak and von Bortkie-
witcz. It is worth remarking that according to this line of interpretation, and 
contrary to what is defended below, the nature of the mathematical tech-
niques used in demonstrations does not constrain the theoretical nature of 
the model. Accordingly, von Neumann’s model would offer proof that op-
timisation tools do not constitute a selective feature of neoclassical eco-
nomics;   Supporters of a neoclassical interpretation put to the fore more technical 
arguments to show that the model may be understood as a special case of 
the more general neoclassical framework. Such generalisations entail, 
among others, the introduction into the model of the intertemporal prefer-
ences of consumers (Edmont Malinvaud 1953), the consideration of labour 
as a primary factor constrained by an exogenous growth rate (Michio Mor-
ishima 1964), a relaxation of the assumption of circularity according to 
which each production process uses or produces a given quantity of each 
good produced in the preceding period (John G. Kemeny, Oskar Morgen-
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stern, and Gerald L. Thompson 1956), etc. This interpretation consists ul-
timately in presenting the 1937 model as a crucial step in the construction 
of the neoclassical paradigm, starting from Léon Walras (through the for-
mulation given by Gustav Cassel) and extending to the modern demonstra-
tion of existence by Kenneth Arrow, and Gérard Debreu.1  
 
It is possible to appraise the relevance of the controversy over the filiations of 
von Neumann’s model from different perspectives. If it were simply a question of 
situating the model either in the classical or the neoclassical camp, then the extent of 
the confrontation would be rather narrow and the relevance of the debate question-
able. However, from an analytical viewpoint, the implications of this confrontation 
have turned out to be very significant for both sides: in the orthodox camp, von 
Neumann’s growth model is at the roots of linear programming, the turnpike theorem 
of Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow, and of modern proofs of existence of general 
equilibrium; in the heterodox camp, the growth model is certainly an important 
source of the classical revival of the 1960s that followed the publication of Sraffa’s 
book. For instance, Goodwin’s limit cycle model formalises short-term economic 
fluctuations along the quasi-stationary long-term equilibrium trend of von Neu-
mann;2 Andras Brody (1970) starts from a simplified version (with no joint produc-
tion) in matrix form of von Neumann’s model in order to propose a mathematical 
rehabilitation of the labour theory of value.  
The variety of the interpretations ultimately shows that von Neumann’s 
growth model hardly fits into the traditional classical/neoclassical classification sys-
tem. It is a characteristic of path-breaking contributions to upset the prevailing 
schemes. Interpreting the growth model in the light of the forthcoming formalist 
revolution of the 1950s means focusing on the nature of the mathematical innova-
tions introduced by von Neumann in economics. These innovations may be appraised 
from different perspectives.  
From a strictly technical viewpoint, von Neumann’s contribution is easy to 
identify: it consists in the generalisation of Broüwer’s Fix Point Theorem. The origi-
nal title of the paper is explicit: “About a System of Economic Equations and a Gen-
eralization of Broüwer’s Fix Point Theorem”. In 1945, Kaldor, then editor of the Re-
view of Economic Studies, asked von Neumann to modify his title to “A Model of 
General Economic Equilibrium”. However, the first sentence of the article is evi-
dence of the author’s priority: “The subject of this paper is the solution of a typical 
economic equation system...”, adding a little further on that “... the mathematical 
proof is possible only by means of a generalization of Broüwer’s Fix Point Theorem 
i.e. by the use of very fundamental topological facts. This generalised Fix Point 
Theorem…is also interesting in itself” (von Neumann 1945/46, p. 29).  
In order to reach this strictly-defined objective, he adopts a typical mathemati-
cal approach (Mohammed Dore 1989a) which consists of encompassing this problem 
                                                        
1 Cf. Roy E. Weintraub (1985), and Bruna Ingrao and Giorgio Israel (1990). 
2 However, according to Richard Goodwin (1989) the most important error he made during his career had 
been to not acknowledge in his day that von Neumann’s 1937 paper was one of the most interesting and 
fertile contributions of the twentieth century, at the origins – among other things – of the modern theory 
of growth. 
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(the extension of Broüwer’s Theorem) within a set of more general problems (solv-
ing a system representing a growth economy), the resolution of which allows a solu-
tion of the original problem. This idea is endorsed by the fact that the Minimax Theo-
rem is an unnecessarily heavy tool to demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium 
solution of this economy: Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1951) provides a demonstra-
tion exclusively based on the properties of convexity and separation of hyper-plans, 
supporting the idea that the growth model represented to von Neumann only a spe-
cific support which allowed him to back up his mathematical results.   
From a methodological perspective, the contribution of the 1937 model is 
much more complex to identify. It is the objective of this rational reconstruction to 
show that von Neumann’s path-breaking contribution consisted of extending the 
standards of rigour of mathematical formalism to the community of economists. Dis-
cussion about the nature of the model’s theoretical foundations is relegated to the 
background.  
It is worth noting that the majority of the protagonists to the filiations debate 
make a point of mentioning the limitations of their comments, recognising to a cer-
tain extent that the field of economics does not represent the privileged field of inves-
tigation of the author: Tjalling C. Koopmans (1964, p. 356) declared along this line 
that despite the unquestionable theoretical advance provided by the 1937 growth 
model, the paper is rather poor economics; in the same way, David G. Champer-
nowne (1945/46, p. 10) conceded that the author approached the question of exis-
tence as a mathematician, putting the emphasis on aspects of the problems distinct 
from those upon which an economist would have insisted; notice also the comment 
of Sukhamoy Chakravarty (1989, p. 70) who, before introducing the Kaldor–Solow 
debate, asserted that it was possible ultimately that von Neumann himself considered 
his paper as essentially technical in nature.3  
“God, it is said, speaks to each of us in our own language…”, Paul Samuelson 
(1989, p. 100) declared with reference to the 1937 paper, explaining further on that 
the genius of von Neumann’s contribution fitted any capital model. von Neumann 
(1945/46, p. 2) himself cleared the question of the filiations in a lapidary (and, after 
the fact, ironic) style: “It is obvious to what kind of theoretical models the above as-
sumptions correspond”, as if this was not the issue at stake, drawing attention once 
more to the technical aspects and the nature of the mathematical approach itself.  
 
2. Von Neumann and the Formalist Programme of Hilbert: 
Before and After Gödel 
 
From the start, a significant problem seems to threaten our interpretation. It is of 
chronological order. The article of 1937 was designed, then published after von 
                                                        
3 To support this assertion, Chakravarty indirectly leaned on the book review Morgenstern wrote in 1941 
on Value and Capital by Hicks. In a biographical note, in fact, it appears that Morgenstern submitted his 
review to the previous reading of von Neumann. It is possible to read here that the main criticism ad-
dressed to Hicks regards precisely the kind of mathematical techniques used to prove the existence of an 
economic equilibrium. Cf. Robert Leonard (1995) for a detailed analysis of the collaboration between 
Morgenstern and von Neumann, and, more precisely, for an analysis of the extent of the intellectual in-
fluence of von Neumann upon Morgenstern. 
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Neumann was informed of the famous theorem of impossibility of Gödel, devastator 
of the mathematical formalist programme and unanimously recognised as an element 
of rupture in the evolution of modern mathematics. von Neumann is also one of the 
first mathematicians to seize the range of Gödel’s theorem and to take into considera-
tion its methodological consequences. It is necessary at this level to reconsider the 
definition of the formalist Hilbertian programme in order to understand more pre-
cisely what the impact of Gödel’s discoveries was, and to what extent it modified 
mathematical practices.4  
The term “formalism” itself is ambiguous because it bears a double signifi-
cance. In its commonly accepted sense, formalism indicates nothing other than the 
mere use of symbols and unspecified mathematical techniques to express an idea. It 
is not acceptance that this term implies when it is associated with Hilbert. By formal-
ism, one then understands a particular philosophy of mathematics which reduces it to 
a formal language, and is opposed to intuitionism and logicism on the question of the 
foundations of mathematics.  
The debate on the foundations emerges among mathematicians at the end of 
the nineteenth century, while attempts to extend the traditional axiomatic (Euclidean) 
method to branches of mathematics other than geometry are multiplying. This 
method consists in accepting without demonstration a reduced set of postulates, the 
axioms, and deducing by logical inference a set of theorems. For a long time, the 
empirical obviousness of axioms seemed to guarantee the veracity of the theorems 
which it was possible to deduce. But the growing abstraction of the mathematical 
practice (axioms are less and less obvious) and the discovery by Cantor and Russell 
of logical antinomies (even if axioms were obvious, contradictions could emerge) 
bring to the foreground the question of the consistency of formal systems. “Consis-
tency” refers to a precise property: a formal system is consistent when it is impossi-
ble to deduce from its axioms two contradictory theorems. Three types of answer 
were advanced to give back to mathematicians their confidence in the rigour of 
mathematical practices.  
Logicists try to found the consistency of mathematics by defining it as a 
branch of logic. The Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell, published in 
1910, falls under this head. There, the authors proposed a formalisation of arithmetic, 
whose goal is to clarify and make explicit all the logical inferences used in the rea-
soning and to show that all the concepts of arithmetic can be brought back to con-
cepts of pure logic. However, this step did not gain much support from mathemati-
cians as this solution did nothing but move the problem: the consistency of arithmetic 
depended on that of logic, and the consistency of logic was then itself under discus-
sion.  
 
                                                        
4 Gödel’s theorems certainly changed von Neumann’s views drastically about what constituted the stan-
dard of good practices in mathematics, but such changes had not been the only ones the mathematician 
experienced during his career. For instance, as suggested by Giocoli (2003), a crucial issue is to under-
stand why, in his 1944 book, von Neumann provided Morgenstern constructive proof of the Minimax 
Theorem and turned to defend classical axiomatics. This interesting question is, however, beyond the 
realm of this paper. 
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Intuitionists, headed by Poincaré and Broüwer, placed the authority of the per-
ception and of the intuition of the mathematician above that of the logical principles 
and inference rules whose historical and cultural relativity were underlined. To be 
consistent, a system of calculation must thus be built from obvious and unimpeach-
able axioms and from rules of inference subjectively considered as reliable by the 
mathematician.5 To Luitzen Broüwer (1912, p. 125), the fundamental dissension 
which exists between intuitionalism and formalism is that a different answer is given 
to the question of knowing where the mathematical accuracy exists: to the intuition-
alist, in human intellect; to the formalist, on paper. Thus, the consistency of a 
mathematical theory does not require a demonstration for intuitionalists insofar as it 
results from the construction itself of the theory, following the principles and the 
procedures acceptable to the majority of mathematicians.  
On the contrary, the response of formalists to the uncertainty on foundations 
consisted of trying to establish rigorous evidence of consistency of the various 
branches of mathematics. Demonstrations of consistency initially take the form of 
relative proofs. Thus, Hilbert showed that the consistency of Euclidean geometry 
depends on that of algebra. Thereafter, he tried, with the assistance of his disciples 
(the first of whom was von Neumann, but also Ackermann and Bernays) to provide 
an absolute demonstration of consistency of arithmetic.6 It is at this level that the fa-
mous impossibility theorem of Gödel intervenes. In 1931, Gödel arrived at a devas-
tating result on the question of the foundations of mathematics. He, in fact, showed 
that it was impossible to provide a demonstration of absolute consistency of arithme-
tic.7 Gödel did not prove the inconsistency of arithmetic, rather, the impossibility of 
showing that it was consistent, leaving the door open to the potential occurrence of 
new logical antinomies. In his book of reference on the question, Morris Kline 
(1980) presented in a provocative way the debate on the foundations of mathematics 
as a major intellectual rout, liquidating the hitherto-dominant design of mathematics 
like point of organ of rigour and scientific exactitude. The title of his work, The Loss 
of Certainty, returned precisely to this radical reconsideration: mathematics cannot 
be unanimously regarded any more as a set of firmly established eternal truths.  
This result certainly cooled down the enthusiasm of formalists but did not put 
an end to the programme of Hilbert whereof the work on foundations constitutes only 
one part. Formalists gave up the hope to be able to show that mathematics were con-
                                                        
5 As a matter of fact, intuitionalists reject the logical principle of exclusion of the middle for infinite sys-
tems. On this subject, Hilbert wrote in 1928 in his Die Grundlagen der Mathematik that to remove this 
principle from the toolbox of mathematicians would be the same thing as prohibiting use of the telescope 
for astronomers, or boxers the use of their fists. 
6 This problem appears in number 2 on the famous list of the 23 problems of Hilbert. At the time of the 
Second International Congress of Mathematics held in Paris in 1900, Hilbert enumerated a list of 23 
major, irresolute mathematical problems, which, according to him, would be solved during the twentieth 
century to allow important progress in the discipline. The optimism of Hilbert will never fade. At the 
time of a noted radio intervention in 1930, he launched his famous “Wir müssen wissen, wir werden 
wissen” (“We must know, we will know”). By today, most of these problems have been solved, and Hil-
bert’s list has been replaced by the seven Millennium Prize problems.  
7 Gödel actually led to two results in his 1931 article: (1) for any formal system including arithmetic, it is 
possible to construct a proposition which is true in this system, but not provable in it; and (2) one cannot 
prove the consistency of a formal system containing a finite theory of numbers. 
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sistent, but they did not give up their confidence in the power of modern axiomatics 
as an engine for discovering new scientific knowledge. As Giorgio Israel and Ana 
Gasca (1995) note indeed, the formalism of Hilbert was founded on the belief in a 
pre-established harmony between mathematics and physical reality, a harmony which 
makes it possible to conceive mathematics like the base of all exact scientific knowl-
edge of nature. The normative aspect of Hilbert’s programme can consequently be 
interpreted as follows: the mathematical analogy, understood as the systematic adop-
tion of the modern axiomatic approach represents the good scientific practice and 
this, whatever the scientific field considered. 
 
I believe: anything at all that can be the object of scientific thought becomes depend-
ent on the axiomatic method, and thereby indirectly on mathematics, as soon as it is 
ripe for the formation of a theory. By pushing ahead to ever deeper layers of axioms . . 
. we also win ever-deeper insights into the essence of scientific thought itself, and we 
become ever more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. In the sign of the axiomatic 
method, mathematics is summoned to a leading role in science.  
 
(Speech by Hilbert 1918, in William B. Ewald 1996; and Roy E. Weintraub 1998) 
 
The association between axiomatic method and scientific rigour thus justifies 
the second side of the formalist programme of Hilbert consisting concretely of trying 
to extend this approach to other scientific disciplines, physics initially, but also eco-
nomics.8 Thus, Hilbert’s formalism has a double finality: to solve the problem of the 
foundations of mathematics (and, at this level, the results of Gödel are without call); 
and to extend modern axiomatics to all the scientific disciplines. This second aspect 
of the programme, the aspect that can be described as the imperialist or normative 
side, survived to Gödel. Weintraub (2002, p. 90) identified these two aspects of the 
formalist programme.9 He distinguished between the Finitist Programme for the 
Foundations of Arithmetic (FPFA) whose objective was to found the consistency of 
arithmetic and the AA (axiomatic approach), the only aspect of the formalist pro-
gramme which has actually influenced the process of mathematisation of economics 
through the contributions of von Neumann for the strictly Hilbertian version of the 
AA programme, and Debreu for the Bourbakist version.10  
 Until 1931, von Neumann was strongly implicated in the two aspects of Hil-
bert’s formalist programme. As far as the work on foundations is concerned, he con-
tributed to the axiomatisation of Cantor’s set theory. This theory, known as the “na-
ïve” theory of sets because it was then not yet in axiomatic form, leads to logical in-
consistencies discovered around 1900 by Cantor himself and by Russell. Since his 
doctorate thesis, von Neumann contributed to looking further into the axiomatisation 
of set theory proposed by Zermelo, Fraenkel and Skolem through the introduction of 
new axioms and methods, making it possible to avoid the occurrence of these contra-
                                                        
8 Let us note, besides, that if the first two points of Hilbert’s list of 1900 relate to the question of the 
foundations of mathematics, item 6 invites to axiomatisation of physics on the model of mathematics. 
9 Leonard (1995, p. 732) also puts ahead these two aspects of the formalist programme of Hilbert: to base 
all the branches of mathematics on a sure axiomatic base; and to extend axiomatics to other fields. 
10 For an account of the differences between the Hilbertian and Bourbakist versions of formalism applied 
to economics, see Philippe Mongin (2003). 
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dictions. The axiomatic method is used in order to allow a rigorous representation of 
the theory within which the origin of contradictions can be easily found and possibly 
eliminated.  
Regarding the normative aspect of the formalist programme, since 1926 von 
Neumann tackled the question of the mathematical axiomatisation of quantum phys-
ics, then defined around the two competing presentations of Heisenberg and 
Schrödinger. This work led to the publication in 1932 of the Mathematical Founda-
tions of Quantum Mechanics in which the author managed to unify these two visions 
within a single formal system. Game theory is another field where the project of ex-
porting modern axiomatics to new fields of scientific knowledge appears: von Neu-
mann followed at the beginning the developments of Zermelo on the axiomatisation 
of chess, a question much debated in discussions in mathematical circles of the inter-
War period. It was a question of showing that a formal system could receive an inter-
pretation in terms of social phenomena rather than in strictly natural terms. von 
Neumann generalised the application of Zermelo to the context of any type of zero-
sum games, and this work led him to the determination of the Minimax Theorem in 
1928. From there on Hilbertian formalism could penetrate the field of individual in-
teractions and be used for the analysis of social phenomena.  
 
3. The Pragmatic Turn 
 
Gödel’s discoveries affected von Neumann deeply. They contributed to immediately 
putting a term to his work on the foundations of mathematics and signalled the be-
ginning of what many commentators describe as a pragmatic turn in the scientist’s 
method.11 Hilbert’s programme on the foundations conveyed the hope of justifying 
the axiomatic method, to carry mathematical results to the statute of eternal truth. 
Gödel destroyed this hope, but the majority of mathematicians (von Neumann among 
them) decided to use this method all the same because it remained, in spite of the loss 
of certainty, a rigorous way of producing scientific knowledge. The second side of 
Hilbert’s programme was unharmed. 
 
The main hope of a justification of classical mathematics – in the sense of Hilbert or of 
Brouwer and Weyl – being gone [Gödel’s discoveries], most mathematicians decided 
to use that system anyway. After all, classical mathematics was producing results 
which were both elegant and useful, and, even though one could never again be abso-
lutely certain of its reliability, it stood on at least as sound a foundation as, for exam-
ple, the existence of the electron. Hence, if one was willing to accept the sciences, one 
might as well accept the classical system of mathematics. Such views turned out to be 
acceptable even to some of the original protagonists of the intuitionistic system. At 
present the controversy about the "foundations" is certainly not closed, but it seems 
most unlikely that the classical system should be abandoned by any but a small minor-
ity. 
(von Neumann 1947, p.194) 
 
 
                                                        
11 Cf., for instance, Israel and Gasca (1995, p. 63). 
163 Introducing Formalism in Economics: The Growth Model of John von Neumann 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 2, pp. 153-172
That said, if, after Gödel, it was accepted that it was impossible to found 
mathematics absolutely, however, indirect ways existed to comfort scientists and to 
relativise the loss of certainty they suffered in full measure. First of all, should a con-
tradiction emerge, formalisation makes it easier to search for its origins and eventu-
ally to eliminate it thanks to the baring of all of the concepts and reasoning interven-
ing in the theory. The position of the Bourbakist programme is for this reason evoca-
tive: the objective of this radical version of formalism is not to found mathematics 
any more, rather, to clarify, through the linking of formal systems with one another, 
the architecture and unity of mathematics. The mathematician must face contradic-
tions, if they emerge, on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Absence of contradiction, in mathematics as a whole or in any given branch of it, thus 
appears as an empirical fact, rather than as a metaphysical principle. The more a 
given branch has been developed, the less likely it becomes that contradictions may be 
met with in its further development. […] What will be the working mathematician's at-
titude when confronted with such dilemmas? It need not, I believe, be other than 
strictly empirical. We cannot hope to prove that every definition, every symbol, every 
abbreviation that we introduce is free from potential ambiguities, that it does not bring 
about the possibility of a contradiction that might not otherwise have been present. Let 
the rules be so formulated, the definitions so laid out, that every contradiction may 
most easily be traced back to its cause, and the latter either removed or so surrounded 
by warning signs as to prevent serious trouble. This, to the mathematician, ought to be 
sufficient; 
(Nicolas Bourbaki, 1949, p.3) 
 
There is a second means of reassuring the scientist about the consistency of his 
formal system. It consists of putting back to the foreground considerations of a se-
mantic nature. This assertion requires further elaboration. A prominent characteristic 
of Hilbertian formalism is without any doubt the strict separation between syntax and 
semantics. To formalise a theory in the sense of Hilbert means indeed emptying it 
from all of its semantic content and giving an abstract representation of it – the for-
mal system – in the form of symbols, formulae (among them axioms) and sequences 
of formulae having no more obvious bond with the theory of departure. The formal 
system thus formed is like an abstract box, deprived of any significance, on which 
the mathematician works in order to draw theorems. At this stage, the question of the 
realism of the axioms is completely irrelevant. But it would be erroneous to say that 
in axiomatics reality does not matter at all, for in the next stage of the axiomatisation 
process, the objective is precisely to assign models to each formal system, that is, to 
find an interpretation in terms of real phenomena for the formal system.12 A model 
consists of an interpretation of the formal system, each symbol receiving a meaning, 
and the same abstract box being able to receive various interpretations. The initial 
theory which inspired the formal system constitutes one model, among others. For-
malism as a philosophy of mathematics is attached at this level with Plato’s realism 
consisting of supporting the thesis that mathematics does not create anything, does 
not invent objects, rather, discovers pre-existent objects in the intellect. The power of 
                                                        
12 Leo Corry (2004) insists on the concern Hilbert presents for the realism of his axiomatic approach. 
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axiomatisation is due precisely to the fact that the “discovery” of an abstract box 
makes it possible to explain several real phenomena, and rests on the belief of a pre-
set adequacy between the structure of mathematics and reality. 
 
From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears thus as a storehouse of ab-
stract forms – the mathematical structures; and so it happens without our knowing 
how that certain aspects of empirical reality fit themselves into these forms, as if 
through a kind of preadaptation.  
(Bourbaki 1950, p.231) 
 
This vision of the world is opposed to constructivism, of which intuitionism is 
a specific form, and which considers that a mathematical object exists only through 
its elaboration. To formalists, on the contrary, the very existence of any mathematical 
concept refers to a precise property: that it is free from any contradiction.  
Before paradoxes and logical antinomies were discovered and encouraged 
mathematicians to work out absolute demonstrations of consistency, it was sufficient, 
in order to found a formal system, to find a model in which its axioms were valid. 
For a long time, the obviousness of the Euclidian axioms was sufficient to ensure the 
consistency of Euclidian geometry: if axioms were valid, then it was also the case for 
the theorems that one could derive from them. The so-called method of the models 
consisting of finding an interpretation to an abstract system in which its postulates 
are valid was largely used to give relative demonstrations of consistency to formal 
systems less intuitive than the Euclidean one. Gödel’s discoveries led mathemati-
cians to reconsider the value of this method. One cannot found the consistency of a 
formal system absolutely, but the discovery of a new and adequate model for this 
system reinforces its heuristic validity and comforts the mathematician regarding its 
consistency. The 1937 contribution of von Neumann may be interpreted in that way: 
a new semantic correspondence is associated with a formal system elaborated be-
forehand. In particular, von Neumann gave an economic interpretation to a formal 
structure which he previously discovered in game theory (1928). This idea was ex-
pressed explicitly by the author himself when he declared that “the question whether 
our problem has a solution is oddly connected with that of a problem occurring in the 
Theory of Games dealt with elsewhere” (von Neumann, 1945/46, p. 33, n. 1).  
The formal similitude between the 1928 and 1937 models is, however, not 
immediate. In 1928, von Neumann demonstrated the existence of a solution for a 
two-person zero-sum game without ever defining a system of linear inequalities and 
equations. As Tinne H. Kjeldsen (2001) states, the Minimax Theorem was developed 
in 1928 with no explicit connection with the theory of linear inequalities, and there 
are no elements that show that von Neumann would be aware at that time of this 
connection. However, the fact that this connection does exist is sufficient to corrobo-
rate this rational reconstruction. Kuhn and Tucker (1958) explicitly link the solutions 
of the minimax problem with a system of linear inequalities and equations which 
corresponds to the problem raised in 1937. They state explicitly that if the intensity 
and price vectors are both normalised, they form probability vectors which may be 
regarded as mixed strategies for the players of a zero-sum two-person game. Dore 
(1989b) also studied the connection between the system of inequalities and equations 
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of the 1937 model and the two-person zero-sum game of 1928: the strategies of 
player I are represented by the set of vectors of production intensities, those of player 
II by the set of price vectors. Payoff functions depend on the strategies chosen by 
each player: player I chooses the vector of the intensities of production which maxi-
mises his payoff function, given the choice of player II, supposed for his part to 
choose the least satisfactory solution for the first player. A symmetrical reasoning 
relates to the choices of player II. The Minimax Theorem ensures the existence of a 
saddle point which corresponds to the situation where the rate of growth is equal to 
the interest rate.  
The 1937 article illustrates the separation and hierarchy between syntax and 
semantics, typical of the axiomatic approach. The same formal system, the same box, 
indeed receives different interpretations, i.e. different models: one in game theory, 
one in economics, and even one in thermodynamics.13 Thanks to Gödel, we know 
that the consistency of this formal system is impossible to prove. However, the fact 
that this system fits different interpretations is a reassuring symptom of its consis-
tency. The economic interpretation is, in this connection, the manifestation of the 
pragmatic turn of the mathematical formalist programme which consisted in consid-
ering not only the syntax aspect, but also the semantic step of the axiomatisation 
process through the identification of adequate new models. Further, with the 1937 
paper, a new domain of application, economics, opened itself up to formalist mathe-
matics, and, more generally, to mathematical analogy.  
 
4. From the Mechanical to the Mathematical Analogy 
 
The growth model was elaborated in 1931 in the United States and first presented to 
a mathematical seminar at Princeton, but it has definitely been arousing interest and 
enthusiasm since its discussion in the Karl Menger seminar in Vienna in 1934. One 
reason for the particular interest of Viennese scholars in the growth model lies in the 
total adequacy between von Neumann’s epistemological approach in this paper and 
the specific philosophical context of the Vienna Circle, marked by analytical phi-
losophy, logical positivism, and a project of unification of sciences.  
One finds a definite parallelism between the concerns of formalist mathemati-
cians on one side and of logical positivist philosophers on the other. The major con-
cern of mathematicians is to eliminate the possibility of contradictory theorems; the 
major concern of philosophers is to eliminate from their discourse all metaphysical 
proposition, i.e. any pseudo-scientific assertion whose intrusion in the reasoning may 
lead to logical inconsistencies. In both cases, discussions are directed towards the 
research of certainty in scientific reasoning.  
The principal theses of logical positivism are presented by Otto Neurath, Ru-
dolf Carnap, and Moritz Hahn in an article of 1929, “The Scientific Conception of 
the World: The Vienna Circle”, better known as the “Manifesto of 29”. Logical posi-
                                                        
13 The thermodynamic interpretation is mentioned by von Neumann only (1945/46, p. 29), who suggests 
an interpretation of function Φ (X, Y) in terms of thermodynamic potentials. This way is explored by 
Brody (1989), who considers economic processes as chemical processes, whose speeds of reaction cor-
respond to the intensities of production. 
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tivism falls under the continuation of the positivist programme of Auguste Comte, 
Hume and Mach, whose objective was to base knowledge directly on experience. To 
this end, members of the Vienna Circle used the latest developments of modern logic 
from Frege, Peano and Russell. More precisely, logical positivism was born from the 
introduction of logical analysis into the positivist framework. Logical analysis con-
sists in reducing scientific concepts and propositions to experience, to direct observa-
tion, from which all the remainder logically arises. In the same way that axiomatisa-
tion makes it possible to uncover the source of possible contradictions easily, logical 
analysis tracks pseudo-propositions and contributes to eliminating them from phi-
losophical discourse. The project of Carnap is even more ambitious. The philosopher 
has been working on a project to work out a formal logico-mathematical language 
used to guard scientists against the surreptitious intervention of pseudo-propositions 
in their reasoning. Philosophy thus becomes analytical: it is finalised with the revela-
tion of the significance of propositions and the elimination of meaningless proposi-
tions. This “turning point of philosophy” (Schlick 1959, p. 56) is an indicator of the 
ambition of logical positivism to aim at unitary science. With analytical philosophy, 
it will not be necessary any more to speak about philosophical problems, because all 
problems will be discussed philosophically, i.e. clearly and meaningfully. The call 
for the unity of science, explicit in the Manifesto, claims to be epistemological. It is a 
means for scientists of working out a way of making science, whatever be the field of 
production of knowledge, which ensures rigorous reasoning, free from metaphysics. 
This is logical analysis for Russell, the universal formal language for Carnap, and 
modern axiomatics for Hilbert.  
The unifying ambition of formalism asserts itself gradually. Initially, it was a 
question of unifying, through the development of modern axiomatics, all the 
branches of mathematics. Formalists, rather, their predecessors, analyticals, were 
then opposed to the purist vision of mathematics dominant by the end of the nine-
teenth century. According to purists, mathematics was to remain split in various 
branches, each defined by its own method of investigation. For example, purists re-
fused geometric demonstrations based on Cartesian algebra. Analyticals, on the con-
trary (with Hilbert in the forefront), believed in the interaction of the various 
branches and shared an ideal of unification of mathematics, conceived as a unified 
system of knowledge. In a second step, this strong optimism exceeded the borders of 
the discipline; building from the success of the axiomatisation of quantum physics, 
formalists then invested the field of social phenomena.  
Economics is implied in the philosophical programme of the Vienna Circle 
through the active interaction of the members of Hans Mayer’s Economic Seminar 
with those of the Mathematical Colloquium run by Menger, son of the founder of the 
Austrian economic tradition. Collaboration between mathematicians and economists 
crystallised in the resolution of the problem of imputation as defined by Menger in 
1871. It consists of deducing the prices of factors of production starting from the 
value of the consumption goods which they contributed to produce. The solution 
suggested in 1889 by Wieser encounters a problem of surdetermination. Schlesinger, 
asked by Mayer to harness himself with the question, radically modified the nature of 
the problem: he endogenised the prices of consumption goods that Menger and Wie-
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ser took as data and posed the equations of a system of generalised interdependence. 
The question of imputation thus becomes that of demonstrating the existence of a 
general equilibrium configuration. Schlesinger, however, did not start from the Wal-
rassian model, but from the very similar one of Gustav Cassel (1923), in which he 
integrated the free goods rule in order to avoid obtaining negative prices in equilib-
rium. The adoption of this rule has important consequences on the formal structure of 
the model: inequalities are introduced into the model; inequalities are relations of 
exclusion which constrain the prices of goods and which have the statute of axioms 
in the formulations offered by the mathematicians (Abraham Wald and later von 
Neumann) called to the rescue to solve the new system thus defined. The introduc-
tion of inequations is typical of formalist mathematics. According to Israel and Gasca 
(1995, p. 65), the motto “less differential equations, more inequalities” perfectly de-
scribes the tendency of the new mathematics.14  
From his collaboration with Schlesinger, Wald produced three articles, pre-
sented at the Mathematical Colloquium between 1934 and 1936.15 Over the course of 
the various articles, the mathematician refined the mathematical conditions necessary 
for the demonstration of existence (the syntax aspect) and concentrated himself more 
particularly on the question of their economic significance (the semantic aspect).16 
von Neumann became aware of Wald’s demonstrations thanks to Menger in 1934 
and announced the proximity with a model of general equilibrium which he had pre-
sented a few times earlier at Princeton. Menger then made an offer to von Neumann 
to publish his article in Ergebnisse (1937). According to Arrow (1989, p. 17), it is 
extremely probable that the models of Schlesinger and Wald on one hand and of von 
Neumann on the other were independently inspired by Cassel. Whereas Schlesinger 
introduced inequalities in the static model of Cassel, and Wald showed the existence 
of an equilibrium solution, von Neumann’s model axiomatises the verbal develop-
ments Cassel made of an economy of generalised interdependence in a situation of 
uniform growth. Nicholas Kaldor (1989, p. viii) said, from his conversations with 
von Neumann, that the dissatisfaction of the mathematician with regard to the Wal-
rassian model had a double origin: the possibility of negative prices at equilibrium, 
and the disinterest in dynamic forces. The 1937 model answered these two criticisms 
appropriately by proposing a model of expansion in which the free goods rule, with 
the statute of axiom of the formal system, eliminated the possibility of negative 
prices in equilibrium. 
The 1937 model, however, also addressed a more general criticism to econo-
mists.17   
                                                        
14 In a letter to Arrow (1989, p. 25), Leijonhufvud relates the following anecdote on this subject. At the 
time of a multidisciplinary seminar in 1930 in Berlin on the application of mathematics to various fields, 
von Neumann had stopped the presentation of a general equilibrium model by Marshak to vigorously 
criticise the use of equations: “but surely you want inequalities, not equations there!” This anecdote is 
also related by Weintraub (1983, p. 13). 
15 A last paper from Wald would have been lost (cf. Arrow, 1989). 
16 For an evaluation of the work of Wald in terms of contribution to the Viennese philosophical project, 
see Philippe Le Gall (1991). 
17 After the presentation of the growth model at the Princeton Mathematical Society in 1932, Abraham 
Flexner, then director of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, sent von Neumann a copy of a book 
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I have the impression that [economics] is not yet ripe (I mean is not yet fully enough 
understood, which of its features are the essential ones) to be reduced to a small num-
ber of fundamental postulates – like geometry, or mechanics… 
 
(von Neumann to Abraham Flexner, May 25, 1934,  
Faculty files, John von Neumann, folder 1933-35, VNIAS) 
 
According to Leonard (1995, p. 738), the fundamental criticism of von Neu-
mann here related to the kind of mathematical instruments used since Walras in eco-
nomic formalisation. However, if one replaced the 1937 contribution within the sec-
ond part of the formalist programme of Hilbert (the imperialist aspect of the pro-
gramme, with its project of extension of modern axiomatics to various fields), then, 
more than the type of tools used, it is the concept itself of scientific rigour which 
seems to be at the heart of von Neumann’s criticisms on the state of the discipline. 
Walras used the mechanical analogy with the stated aim of giving economics the sci-
entific rigour which was lacking till that point. Walrassian economics, like the other 
sciences based on the mechanical analogy, adopts as scientific criterion of rigour 
confrontation with reality. Accordingly, a model is an economy in miniature which is 
sufficiently simplified to allow mathematical treatment. The adoption of the mathe-
matical analogy radically modifies this perception. Scientific rigour is defined ac-
cording to internal criteria, mainly aesthetical (von Neumann 1947); rigour becomes 
synonymous with purity, abstraction, and consistency of the formal system. Cer-
tainly, scientific rigour is a relative and changing concept. Thanks to Gödel, von 
Neumann paid the price.18 In the ultimate analysis, Gödel’s discoveries resounds like 
a bulwark against possible drift towards abstraction, of which Hilbertian formalism 
could be the thin end of the wedge. 
 
As a mathematical discipline travels far from its empirical source, or still more, if it is 
a second and third generation only indirectly inspired by ideas coming from "reality" 
it is beset with very grave dangers. It becomes more and more purely aestheticizing, 
more and more purely l'art pour l'art. This need not be bad, if the field is surrounded 
by correlated subjects, which still have closer empirical connections, or if the disci-
pline is under the influence of men with an exceptionally well-developed taste. But 
there is a grave danger that the subject will develop along the line of least resistance, 
that the stream, so far from its source, will separate into a multitude of insignificant 
branches, and that the discipline will become a disorganized mass of details and com-
plexities. In other words, at a great distance from its empirical source, or after much 
"abstract" inbreeding, a mathematical subject is in danger of degeneration. At the in-
ception the style is usually classical; when it shows signs of becoming baroque, then 
                                                                                                                                          
of George and Edouard Guillaume, L’Économique Rationnelle, at the origin of these criticisms on the 
state of economics. The authors gave a mathematical representation of a production economy explicitly 
formalised on the basis of a strict analogy with physics. This episode is reported in detail by Leonard 
(1995, p. 736). 
18 “I have told the story of this controversy [on the foundations of mathematics] in such detail, because I 
think that it constitutes the best caution against taking the immovable rigor of mathematics too much for 
granted. This happened in our own lifetime, and I know myself how humiliatingly easily my own views 
regarding the absolute mathematical truth changed during this episode, and how they changed three times 
in succession!” (von Neumann 1947, p.195). 
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the danger signal is up. It would be easy to give examples, to trace specific evolutions 
into the baroque and the very high baroque, but this, again, would be too technical. 
 
(von Neumann 1947, p.195) 
 
Of course, these critics are not concerned specifically with economics but with 
the most abstract practices of mathematicians, as, for instance, in the Bourbakist pro-
gramme, the radical extension of formalism. But by substituting the term “mathe-
matical” by “economical” in the preceding quotation, the criticism remains valid to 
some extent, testifying to the success of the imperialist incursion of formalism in 
economics.  
The thesis of this paper is that the 1937 article is a contribution to the mathe-
matical formalist programme. We defined this programme around two finalities: the 
search for certainty, and the project of unifying sciences. After Gödel’s discoveries, 
the first part of the programme has faded deeply, whereas the second aspect remains 
intact. At the end of our reflection, it seems to us that the 1937 article fully fits the 
second aspect of this programme and reflects to a certain extent its new pragmatic 
dimension. We indeed tried to show that, a posteriori, von Neumann’s 1937 contri-
bution fulfils a twofold motivation: 
  To find a new model of a formal system insofar as, if it is not possible to 
prove the consistency of a system, it is nevertheless possible to consolidate 
the certainty of scientists through the exhibition of a new adequate inter-
pretation;   To replace the use in economics of the mechanical analogy by the mathe-
matical analogy.  
 
Admittedly, much has already been written on the “most important paper done 
in mathematical economics” (Weintraub 1985, p. 27; and 2002, p. 95). It was dis-
guised with the most various interpretations. Ours is a contribution to the more re-
stricted set of comments which concentrate less on possible filiations of the model 
than on the range of the original methodological approach of the author, positioning 
the 1937 contribution in the formalist revolution in economics. On this subject, von 
Neumann was, in those days, an enlightened defender of modern axiomatics, con-
scious of the possible drifts of formalist practices towards “the baroque”, towards 
“l’art pour l’art”, and it seems that his warnings concern economists very much to-
day. 
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